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Abstract
We characterize the interplay between ¯rms' decision in terms of product standardiza-
tion and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour. We prove the existence of a
non-monotone relationship between ¯rms' decision at the product stage and their in-
tertemporal preferences.
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1 Introduction
Standardization and compatibility between products belonging to the same industry are
receiving a growing attention in the current literature, with and without network external-
ities (for the ¯rst approach, see Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Farrell and Saloner, 1986, inter
alia; for the second, Matutes and Regibeau, 1988; Economides, 1989; Chou and Shy, 1990).
Besides, there exists a wide literature concerning the e®ects of product substitutability
on the stability of implicit collusion either in output levels or in prices, leading to hetero-
geneous conclusions (Deneckere, 1983; Chang, 1991, 1992; Rothschild, 1992; Ross, 1992;
Friedman and Thisse, 1993; HÄackner, 1994, 1995; Lambertini, 1997, inter alia). Hence,
a twofold question springs to mind, namely, whether supplying standardized products
may facilitate implicit collusion in the market phase1 or, whether the attempt at collud-
ing may induce standardization. We setup a duopoly model where the cost and bene¯t
of standardization are evaluated against the individual discount factor common to both
¯rms, and we prove that the decisions concerning standardization and market behaviour
are non-monotone in ¯rms' intertemporal preferences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is laid out in
section 2. Firms' interaction is analysed in section 3. Section 4 provides concluding
remarks.
2 The setup
Two independent labs operating in the intermediate product market supply a component
which contributes to characterize the service o®ered by the ¯nal product. The right to
adopt each component costs ©. The two components are equivalent in terms of their
service but not fully compatible with each other. Two a priori identical ¯rms operate on
the market, selling possibly di®erentiated ¯nal products. Each ¯rm faces the following
inverse demand function (see Singh and Vives, 1984):
pi = 1¡ qi ¡ °qj (1)
in which ° 2 (0; 1] measures the degree of substitutability or standardization. By inverting
(1), the direct demand function obtains:
qi =
1
1 + °
¡ 1
1¡ °2 pi +
°
1¡ °2pj : (2)
Marginal production cost of the ¯nal product is constant and normalized to zero.
We consider the following time structure. At the beginning of the game (t = 0), ¯rms
decide whether or not to share a licence, splitting its cost © evenly. If they do, they will
produce a standardised ¯nal product with ° = 1 as a result. Otherwise, if each ¯rm buys a
1A similar issue is addressed by Martin (1995), showing that cooperation in R&D leading to a cost-
reducing innovation may enhance cartel stability.
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licence separately, paying © independently, then ° = 1 if the ¯rms buy the component from
the same lab,2 or ° = ¹° 2 (0; 1] if from di®erent labs. Thenceforth, ¯rms play a symmetric
supergame in marketing over the horizon t = (1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ;1), either in prices or in quantities.
Throughout the game, the discount factor ± is common to both ¯rms. In establishing the
critical threshold of the discount factor stabilizing collusion under either price or quantity
competition, we follow the conventional folk theorem, implying that each ¯rm cooperates
as long as the rival does likewise; then, if deviation is detected, say at time t, both ¯rms
revert to the one-shot Nash equilibrium from t+1 onwards. As a consequence, the critical
threshold of the discount factor turns out to be ±¤K = (¼
D
K ¡¼MK )=(¼DK ¡¼NK); K = B;C;
where K indicates the form of competition (B standing for Bertrand competition, and
C for Cournot competition). Moreover, ¼MK ; ¼
D
K ; ¼
N
K denote, respectively, cartel pro¯t,
deviation pro¯t and one-shot Nash equilibrium pro¯t per ¯rm per period, under the
type of competition K. For future reference, it is useful to derive explicitly here the
threshold levels of the discount factor ±¤K under both quantity and price competition.
Straightforward calculations are needed to derive the per period per ¯rm noncooperative
pro¯ts (Singh and Vives, 1984):
¼NC =
1
(2 + °)2
; ¼NB =
1¡ °
(2¡ °)2(1 + °) : (3)
Obviously, the cartel pro¯t is the same in both settings, i.e., ¼MC = ¼
M
B = 1=[4(1 + °)],
while deviation pro¯ts in the two cases can be obtained by the reaction functions of the
cheating ¯rm, under the assumption that the other ¯rm sticks either to the monopoly
price or to the monopoly output:
¼DC =
(2 + °)2
16(1 + °)2
8° 2 (0; 1]; ¼DB =
8>>><>>>:
(2¡ °)2
16(1¡ °2) 8° 2 (0;
p
3¡ 1];
(2° ¡ 1)
4°2
8° 2 (p3¡ 1; 1] :
(4)
As a result, the two critical thresholds of the discount factor are determined as follows:
±¤C =
(2 + °)2
8 + 8° + °2
8° 2 (0; 1]; ±¤B =
8>>><>>>:
(2¡ °)2
8¡ 8° + °2 8° 2 (0;
p
3¡ 1];
(2¡ °)2(°2 + ° ¡ 1)
(2¡ °)2(°2 + ° ¡ 1) + °4 8° 2 (
p
3¡ 1; 1] :
(5)
In the case of Bertrand behaviour, the functional form of ±¤B modi¯es as ° increases abovep
3 ¡ 1, since above that value the non-negativity constraint on the quantity sold by
the ¯rm being cheated becomes binding (see Deneckere, 1983; and Ross, 1992). ±¤B is
increasing and convex in ° 2 (0;p3¡ 1], decreasing and concave in ° 2 (p3¡ 1; 1] . On
the other hand, ±¤C is increasing and convex over the whole range ° 2 (0; 1] . When ° = 1,
±¤C = 9=17 and ±
¤
B = 1=2:
Unlike Deneckere, we consider the choice of ° as a costly commitment. Therefore,
¯rms face a tradeo® between the cost of di®erentiation and the increase in the stream of
operative pro¯ts they may obtain through collusion in the market supergame.
2This is dominated by a joint licence and thus never chosen in equilibrium. Therefore, we ignore this
case in sections 3 and 4.
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3 The supergame
Depending upon whether the marketing stage is a Cournot supergame or a Bertrand
supergame, we consider the following two subcases.
3.1 The Cournot supergame
In this case, the decision tree appears as in ¯gure 1.
Figure 1 : Discounted pro¯ts per ¯rm.
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Depending upon the ¯rms' discount factor ±, the parameter space can be divided into
the following three regimes:
1. ± 2 [9=17; 1): In this region, ¯rms cooperate in the market stage, irrespectively of
their behaviour in the product development phase, that is, for either value of °:
Therefore, ¯rms must choose IM over JM if and only if"
1
4(1 + ¹°)
¡ 1
8
#
±
1¡ ± ¸
©
2
: (6)
2. ± 2 [±¤C(¹°); 9=17): In this region, ¯rms cooperate in the market stage if and only if
they have previously chosen independent ventures. Hence, ¯rms must choose IM
over JN if and only if "
1
4(1 + ¹°)
¡ 1
9
#
±
1¡ ± ¸
©
2
: (7)
3. ± 2 [0; ±¤C(¹°)): In this region, ¯rms play the one-shot Cournot-Nash equilibrium
at the market stage, irrespectively of their behaviour in the product development
phase, that is, for either value of °: Thus, ¯rms shall choose IN over JN if and only
if "
1
(2 + ¹°)2
¡ 1
9
#
±
1¡ ± ¸
©
2
: (8)
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These three regimes span the parameter space f(±; ¹°;©)g: Figure 2 plots ¹° and © against
±: Overall, independent ventures tend to become more attractive as ± approaches 1. For
intermediate values of ±, however, as is clear from the above, in the regime 2 the condition
for independent ventures is loosened comparative to the adjacent areas. The intuition
behind this result is the fact that, when their discount factor ± lies in regime 2, ¯rms
can sustain quantity collusion if and only if they have chosen independent ventures. Note
that the boundary between independent and joint ventures is monotone over the range
± 2 [0; 9=17) and over the range ± 2 [9=17; 1): Dotted lines indicate those values of ¹° and
© with which ¯rms' venture decisions become non-monotone.
Figure 2 : Comparative statics with respect to the discount factor ± .
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Finally, ¯gure 3 plots © against ¹°: Over the range ± 2 [0; 9=17), the boundary between
independent and joint ventures shifts up as ± increases. When ± reaches 9/17, the bound-
ary jumps down (thick curves) and thereon shifts up again as ± approaches 1. In general,
¯rms' propensity for independent ventures increases in ± . Only in the area between the
two thick curves, ¯rms' decisions between independent and joint ventures become non-
monotone. In the neighbourhood of ± = 9=17, while ± is still in regime 2, ¯rms need
independent ventures in order to sustain quantity collusion. Then, once ± crosses slightly
above the threshold value 9/17, ¯rms are free from the fear of Cournot-Nash competition.
Thus, now that quantity collusion is guaranteed, the incentives for independent ventures
decrease and ¯rms collude in both phases. This reversal in ¯rms' product innovation
decisions takes place only in this area, and only around ± = 9=17:
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Figure 3 : Cost (©) - bene¯t (¹°) comparative statics given ± .
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3.2 The Bertrand supergame
In this case, the decision tree appears as in ¯gure 4.
Figure 4 : Discounted pro¯ts per ¯rm.
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Depending upon the ¯rms' discount factor ±, the parameter space can be divided into
the following three regimes:
1. ± 2 [±¤B(¹°); 1): In this region, ¯rms cooperate in the market stage, irrespectively of
their behaviour in the product development phase, that is, for either value of °.
Therefore, ¯rms must choose IM over JM if and only if"
1
4(1 + ¹°)
¡ 1
8
#
±
1¡ ± ¸
©
2
: (9)
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2. ± 2 [1=2; ±¤B(¹°)): In this region, ¯rms cooperate in the market stage if and only if
they have previously chosen to undertake a joint venture. Hence, ¯rms must choose
IN over JM if and only if"
1¡ ¹°
(2¡ ¹°)2(1 + ¹°) ¡
1
8
#
±
1¡ ± ¸
©
2
: (10)
3. ± 2 [0; 1=2): In this region, ¯rms play the one-shot Bertrand-Nash equilibrium at the
market stage, irrespectively of their behaviour in the product development phase,
that is, for either value of °: Hence, ¯rms shall choose IN over JN if and only if
1¡ ¹°
(2¡ ¹°)2(1 + ¹°) ¢
±
1¡ ± ¸
©
2
: (11)
Again, these three regimes span the parameter space f(±; ¹°;©)g: Figure 5 plots ¹° and ©
against ± . In general, independent product development tends to become more attractive
as ± increases. For intermediate values of ±, contrarily to the Cournot case, in the regime
2 the condition for independent ventures is tightened as compared to the adjacent areas.
The intuition behind this result traces back to the fact that, when their discount factor
± lies in regime 2, ¯rms can sustain price collusion if and only if they have chosen a joint
venture. Note that the boundary between independent and joint ventures is monotone
over the range ± 2 [0; 1=2) and over the range ± 2 [1=2; 1): Dotted lines indicate those
values of ¹° and © with which ¯rms' decisions between independent and joint ventures are
non-monotone.
Figure 5 : Comparative statics with respect to the discount factor ± .
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Finally, ¯gure 6 plots © against ¹°: Over the range ± 2 [0; 1=2), the boundary between
independent and joint ventures shifts up as ± increases. When ± reaches 1/2, the boundary
6
rotates clockwise (thick curves). Thereafter, the boundary shifts up again as ± approaches
1. In general, ¯rms' propensity for independent ventures increases in ± , except in the area
between the two thick curves. Over this area, while ± is in regime 3, ¯rms have no hope for
price collusion, whereas once ± crosses above the threshold value 1/2, ¯rms can collude
only after a joint venture. This makes a joint venture in product development more
attractive in regime 2. Note that the area between the two curves is far larger than in
the Cournot case, the reason being that the prospect of collusive pro¯ts in the future is
more relevant under Bertrand competition.
Figure 6 : Cost (©) - bene¯t (¹°) comparative statics given ± .
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The above analysis can be summarized in the following
Proposition. Under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, there exists a range of
parameter values (¹°;©) over which ¯rms' decisions on product standardization are non-
monotone in their discount factor ± .
4 Concluding remarks
We have analysed the unfolding of ¯rms' behaviour in a di®erentiated duopoly where
¯rms must ¯rst decide upon product compatibility and then play an in¯nitely repeated
market game where they have the option to implicitly collude. Contrary to some of the
earlier beliefs, we have established that the relationship between product compatibility
(or di®erentiation) and the discount factor can indeed be non-monotone. This seemingly
counterintuitive result stems from the balance between cost consideration in choosing
between standardization and variety, and ¯rms' concern towards future cartel stability.
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